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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature 0f the Case
This appeal challenges the lower court’s grant 0f Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment
Pleadings, ﬁled

by Noah G.

Hillen,

(hereafter “Hillen”)

011

the

acting in his capacity as personal

representative 0f the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, (hereafter “Victoria” 0r “Decedent”).

Hillen

“VKSIII”),

sought

from property

that

authorization from the former

Smith

VKSIII has continuously had possession

owner and Decedent,

agreement that completely remodeled the
hereafter “Vernon”) funding for

Vernon K.

0f Defendant—Appellant,

ejectment

all

interior

Victoria,

upon a

III

since

restoration

((hereafter

2006, With

and maintenance

with his and his Father’s (Vernon K.

Smith—

materials and labor, with continued possession since Victoria’s

death on September 11, 2013, pursuant to Vernon’s 2/3rds ownership interest as an heir of
Victoria’s assets.

The judgment on appeal

is

based upon Hillen’s alleged exclusive

titled

ownership 0f the

property in his Complaint, asserting “ownership” as the fundamental element t0 support the

ejectment action. See

Ada County Highway

360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), wherein

it

Dist. v Total

Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho

holds that “Ejectment requires proof 0f (1) ownership, (2)
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possession by defendants, and (3) refusal to surrender possession.
Hillen’s “ownership” claim

was Challenged by VKSIII and Vernon Within

pleadings, as a personal representative

,

the responsive

acting in a ﬁduciary capacity, can never be the titled

owner

of a Decedent’s property, as a matter 0f law, since the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) places
ownership immediately upon death With the heirs 0r devisees, vesting
possession, subject only to administration of the estate

by

titled

ownership and right t0

the ﬁduciary,

empowered

to take

possession from the heirs or devisees upon the showing of a necessity for the satisfaction 0f

and other interested persons (mortgagees 0r Trust Deed holders), and absent such

creditors’ claims

claims or interests, n0 authority Will authorize a ﬁduciary t0
property. This

ﬁrst

is

is

the second of four cases ﬁled

by

Hillen v Gibson, Docket N0. 47687-2020,

II.

Hillen,

become a

“titled

owner” 0f Decedent’s

and second appeal taken

t0 this court.

The

Ada County Case N0. CV01-19-10368.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

B. Procedural History
This action was

commenced by

pp.7-24), seeking to eject

Hillen

was

for Jury Trial

setting forth a factual

On

VKSIII from possession 0f the Raymond

the exclusive titled

and Demand

October

owner of Decedent’s

on July

and legal basis

9,

Hillen, the Personal Representative

2019

Pleadings, regarding Count

3,

2019

7,

2019, (Cl. R.

upon the

VKSIII ﬁled

his

pretext

Answer

denying the claim of ownership,

that challenged Hillen’s claim.

(C1. R. pp. 46-49), Hillen

I,

Street property,

property. In response,

(C1. R. pp. 25-45),

0n June

ﬁled Motion for Partial Judgment 0n the

requesting ejectment of VKSIII from the property he continually

possessed since 2006, comprising one 0f Decedent’s former assets. Hillen requested the judgment

be certiﬁed for appeal

memorandum

(if entered)

(C1. R. pp.

under Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P.

(C1.

R. pp. 46-47). Hillen submitted his

49-58) and Declaration (C1. R. pp. 59-62), to Which VKSIII presented his

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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opposition on

2019

November

(C1. R. pp.

December

17,

8,

95-129).

2019

(C1.

2019

(C1.

November

27,

in Opposition

0n

R. pp. 66-95) With Hillen’s reply submitted

VKSIII presented a Supplemental Memorandum

R. pp. 130-151), to Which Hillen objected 0n December 31, 2019 (C1. R.

pp. 152-157).

The matter was heard 0n December

3,

2019 and January

14,

2020, and 0n February 10,

2020, the lower Court issued an Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings, Certiﬁcation, and Writ of Assistance (C1. R. pp. 156-180; 228-240; 228-249), issuing a

Certiﬁed Partial Judgment under Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P. (C1. R. pp. 208-210; 250-252).

Between

the Order /Decision and entry 0f the Partial Certiﬁed Judgment, Hillen ﬁled for

Attorney Fees and Costs 0n February 24, 2020

ﬁrm’s counsel

2020

R. pp. 190-210), t0 Which VKSIII

(C1.

(C1. R. pp.

(C1. R. pp. 181-189), ﬁling a Declaration

moved t0 Disallow

21 1—222), citing authority to defeat Hillen’s

The lower court considered the motion
and Order on April

1,

2020 deferring the

fees

0f the

and costs 0n March

5,

Memorandum for Fees and Costs.

for attorney fees, Without hearing, issuing a Decision

issue of attorney fees (not contained in the Clerk’s Record,

but withholding any decision on fees and costs until ﬁnal judgment.

From the Judgment and Writ of Assistance, VKSIII ﬁled his Notice of Appeal 0n March
2020

(C1. R. pp.

16,

223-253), containing the Decision, Writ, and Certiﬁed Partial Judgment (Cl. R. pp.

228-252) appealed from, and taken t0

On March

this appellate Court.

27, 2020, Hillen sought t0

been incorporated and submitted t0

III.

augment the record

(C1.

R. pp. 253-256), Which has

this court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

C. Factual Background
This independent proceeding arises out of the probate controversy Within the Estate of

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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Victoria H.

Smith. In the probate, the magistrate determined Victoria’s February

14,

1990

Holographic Will was invalid as a result of undue inﬂuence, and ordered transfers 0f Victoria’s
property to

VHS

LLC

Properties,

that occurred July 4,

2012

to

be reversed. The Magistrate

concluded the transfer was an act 0f “gifting”, about which the Court declared the Power 0f
Attorney lacked authority t0 conduct “gifting”. Those disputed ﬁndings were upheld by the Idaho

Supreme Court

T0

as reﬂected Estate

omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d

effectuate the reversal, the magistrate issued a

referred to at times as “Instrument” for convenience)

declares heirs or devisees immediately vested With

,

title

2017 vesting

2,

title

and ownership

t0

contrary t0 the Statute and case law that

upon Decedent’s

0r any ﬁduciary administering the formed Estate. This Instrument

memorandum

15 (2018).

Rule 70(b) Order/Judgment (hereafter

0n June

the property with Hillen, the Personal Representative

6,

death, not With the Estate

was

relied

upon

in Hillen’s

supporting his motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the content 0f which

Instrument Hillen concluded placed ownership 0f Decedent’s property With him, not the heirs of the

Decedent, notwithstanding the controlling Statute and case law.

VKSIII had been

in continuous possession

0f the

Raymond

Street facility since 2006,

having completely remodeled the interior and substantial improvements 0f the exterior.

came

into possession in

September

11,

Victoria,

2013, along with the express agreement with Vernon,

of Victoria’s property

“VHS”)

2006 through the agreement with

assets,

along With the agreement from

that held title t0 the property

possession of the

Raymond

from July

4,

VHS

who

VKS

III

died 9 years later on

Who became
Properties,

the 2/3rds heir

LLC,

(hereafter

2012, and VKSIII remains in constructive

Street premises, as Hillen has not pursued the ejectment with the

Writ, and Hillen has since withdrawn his appointment, resigned as the personal representative,

and a successor personal representative has been appointed.
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VKSIII’S possession continued under his agreement With Victoria and Vernon, and

VKSIII had invested

and

substantial funds

occupancy, and Vernon became counsel t0 protect VKSIII

Vernon was

the 2/3““ the statutorily vested

premises from prior rental

effort t0 restore the

and

titled

interests, as the Hillen

owner

to the

Raymond

was aware

Street premises,

pursuant t0 the Uniform Probate Code and case law, and has been repeatedly told a Personal
Representative cannot hold

in Idaho,

Lemp

title,

conﬁrmed by

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 184

v.

Magistrate placing

title

the

UPC

and as declared by the long-standing law

P. 222, (1919), un—affected

with a ﬁduciary performing under the

by any Instrument 0f a

UPC.

Hillen chose t0 pursue a confrontational course of action with Vernon, engaging in
litigation that has

been deemed by Vernon

pursuing attempts t0
despite Hillen being

sell

to

be immensely wasteful and non-productive

property in the absence 0f any necessity as required under the

bound by

ﬁduciary from dissipating the physical assets of the
the fact there

were no creditors and

estate to liquidate assets instead

all

heirs. Critically

imposed upon a

important in this controversy

taxes had been paid, leaving n0 justiﬁcation within the

0f pursuing the in-kind distribution preferred in probate

Vernon’s frustration with Hillen’s behavior has been Hillen’s
to preserve assets, as they

UPC,

the limitations of his authority t0 liquidate the heirs’ assets, and

the magistrate’s Instrument does not eliminate the limitations the legislature has

is

activity,

belong to the

heirs,

failure in his

and when there are n0 creditors

estates.

ﬁduciary duty

t0 satisfy

and n0

other interests 0r taxes to address, the senseless liquidation 0f unique property assets only created
capital gains taxation,

and as an owner 0f the

statutory pursuit 0f a distribution in-kind,

and creating

assets of Victoria,

Vernon sought

the preferred

and not foolishly liquidate unique property

capital gains taxation, giving rise t0 every

good reason

Appellant’s Opening Brief

P.

10

t0

interests

oppose Hillen’s behavior

and the removal of VKSIII from the Raymond Street property, seeking

damage by un-wanted tenants,
VKSIII has been an

as that asset

would be among those

exposure to

distributed to Vernon.

and Vernon, as he has served

asset to both Victoria

renovate, maintain, and protect the property from the excessive

Who have

t0 prevent

wear and

to remodel,

tear caused

by

tenants

a tendency to lack respect for private property.

Vernon’s

status in the estate is

established case law, statutorily

an owner—heir, pursuant to

mandated

t0

be a vested and

§15-3-101, embraced by well-

I.C.

titled

owner, being the 2/3“” heir 0f

Victoria’s assets. There are substantial property assets in Decedent’s Estate to allow in—kind

distribution as

mandated by the

Statute,

and VKSIII’s presence was under Vernon’s possessory

through his ownership t0 the premises, as Vernon’s funds ﬁnanced

interest

renovation, and

VKSIII has never been an unlawﬁll

detainer,

and n0 beneﬁt

much of the

remodel-

t0 the heirs

would be

served by his ejectment, as VKSIII has preserved Vernon’s ownership interest and statutory
possession, t0

and the

UPC

Whom the

Statute

and case law supports Vernon’s

limits Hillen to take possession only

interestedpersons, 0f which there are none, and

n0

titled

when needed

ownership and possession,

to satisﬁ/ creditors 0r other

factual basis supports otherwise.

Hillen’s desire to sell all property has been entirely unnecessary, and Hillen

authority to take possession to liquidate property that appears to beneﬁt

Vernon resolved

all

claims and

Victoria’s death in 2013, With

no

assistance

creditors, as

liabilities

from

had n0

someone other than

0f both his Father and Mother long before

his brother, Joseph, the remaining 1/3rd heir

under

the Intestate disposition currently in place.

Vernon has vigorously opposed
properties,

and Hillen

is

Hillen’s attempt t0 take possession of these remaining

acting in contradiction t0 his ﬁduciary duty and Without supporting

necessity t0 sell property t0 satisfy creditors under the applicable provisions 0f the

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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UPC,

but instead

acts

upon a

strained construction 0f the misplaced Instrument of the Magistrate.

In the absence 0f necessity arising out of the administration 0f the estate for the beneﬁt of

creditors or other interested persons,

distribution of assets

among

heirs, as

LC.

§

opposed

15-3-71

1,

the

t0 liquidation.

UPC

prefers

and promotes in—kind

I.C. § 15-3-906.

Actions taken by

Hillen in excess 0f a ﬁduciary’s authority results in a breach 0f ﬁduciary duty remediable

award of damages,

I.C. § 15-3-712,

and will be restrained by an Order 0fthe Court,

by an

I.C. § 15-3-607.

D. Hillen’s Proceedings For Eiectment 0f VKSIH
Hillen, after ﬁling his

Pleadings, asserting he

Complaint

t0 eject

VKSIII, ﬁled for Partial Judgment on the

was owner of Decedent’s property, and

entitled to all rights, as the

owner, t0 do what he wants with the property, arguing that Vernon, though a 2/3rds heir of
assets

of Victoria, was n0 longer an interested owner 0f the assets under the Instrument, and

Vernon had n0 say

upon

all

in the process

0f any ejectment 0r sale 0f the property. Hillen relied entirely

the magistrate’s Instrument entered June 2, 2017, but Hillen never established any

necessity or obtained an order t0 conduct a sale, if necessary, as

was

in existence With the

Gowen

Field property involving Gibson, also on appeal as identiﬁed above.

Vernon was knowledgeable 0f the

historical facts regarding this property

and VKSIII

continuing possessory interests, believing Hillen lacks standing t0 bring his ejectment action
against

heirs

VKSIII upon any claim Hillen was a

0f the decedent

titled

and vested owner of the property, as only

are, not a personal representative, acting in a ﬁduciary capacity

under his

appointment, Who, by law, cannot hold ownership 0f the property. Hillen has never sought a
right t0 claim a

there

need for possession for any factually based purpose, as there were none, and

was n0 order

in place

on Raymond

Street t0 permit a sale, as

necessary t0 address any issues 0f taxation.
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no

further sale

was ever

STANDARD OF REVIEW

IV.
The

issues raised in this appeal regard Whether a factual-lawful basis exists, as a matter of

law, Within the allegations 0f the complaint t0 grant judgment on the pleadings in this controversy

under Hillen’s claim he
civil

is

the exclusive titled

owner of the property,

necessitating review 0f rules of

procedure, the statutes, and their interpretation, to determine in what manner Hillen’s

allegation he

is

the titled and vested

owner 0f Decedent’s property

case law t0 grant his motion, as his “ownership”

is

had n0

UPC, arguably

un—enforceable and void,

statutory authority t0 transfer property in Violation of the statute.

disposition 0f the Magistrate

0f law upon which

supported by the Statute and

based upon an Instrument of the magistrate,

entered in contradiction of the statutory provisions 0f the

as the magistrate

is

was

in excess

0f a Magistrate jurisdictional power. These are questions

this appellate court exercises free review.

"[t]his

Court freely reviews the

Luke's Reg'l Med.

interpretation 0f a statute

and

Comm'rs 0f Ada

146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). Because

Cnly.,

its

application t0 the facts

St.

presents a question 0f law, and with respect t0 statutory interpretation, this issue

one 0f free review, as

that standard

was

stated in

St.

Ctr., Ltd. v.

is

Dist.

V

Total Success Investments,

“When review of a
free

trial court's

this

Bd. 0f
appeal

recognized to be

Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding

County, 159 Idaho 84, 86, 356 P.3d 377, 379 (2015), and previously addressed in

Highway

The

LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323

decision involves entwined questions of law and

Ada County

(2008), stating

fact,

we

exercise

review over questions of law, and uphold factual ﬁndings supported by substantial and

competent evidence.”, citing Marshall

v.

Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679,

The process 0f statutory construction and
Court, as general rule, in Hoﬂer

v.

v.

was summarized by

the

Supreme

Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016)

“The objective 0f
intent.” State

interpretation

946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997).

statutory interpretation is t0 give effect t0 legislative

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007).
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“When

interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the literal

words 0f the

statute.

“If

.”
.

.

.

unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent 0f the legislative
.”
Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnly. Bd. 0f
Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting St. Luke’s Reg’ l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. 0f Comm ’rS ofAda Cnly.,
the statutory language

body must be given

is

effect.

.

.

146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This Court does not have the
Verska v. Saint
to modify an unambiguous legislative enactment.

authority

Alphonsus Reg’

Med. Cm, 151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011) (quoting
Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962)
160 Idaho at 884, 380 P.3d at 695.
l

Issues addressed in a

I.R.C.P.,

and

Motion

for

Judgment 0n the Pleadings

facts considered outside the actual pleadings

is

controlled

by Rule 12(c)&(d),

invokes Rule 56, I.R.C.P.,

Rule 12(0) I.R.C.P., addresses such Motions as follows:
“After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the

may move

for

judgment 0n the pleadings.

pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are
court, the

motion

shall

be treated as one for

provided in Rule 56, and
all

material

When

all parties shall

trial, any party
on a motion for judgment on the
presented t0 and not excluded by the
summary judgment and disposed 0f as

If

be given reasonable opportunity

t0 present

made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56”

an appellate court reviews a decision entered upon a summary proceeding, the

appellate Court

employs the same standard as the

District Court.

Farmers National Bank

Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 318 P3d 622 (2014); Cnly. ofBoise

v.

v.

Idaho Cntys. Risk

Mgmt. Program, Underwriters, 151 Idaho 901, 904, 265 P.3d 514, 517 (201 1).

A judgment upon

the pleadings results

When

the

any material allegations 0fthe Complaint. See Alspaugh
Collins, 6 Idaho 536, 57 P. 310; Mills Novelty C0.

v.

Burke, 27 Idaho 464 149 P. 511 (1915); and Jones

1161 (1986). In Hicks
the pleadings

is

the complain

."

v.

Lovell,

64 Cal.

14,

v.

answer does not putforth an issue as

v.

Coombs

v.

Davenport

v.

Reid, 6 Idaho 223, 55 P. 300;

Dunbar, 11 Idaho 671, 83

P. 932;

City ofSt. Maries, 111 Idaho 733,

49 Am. Rep. 679, 27

P. 942,

it

t0

727 P.2d

was held Judgment on

authorized “where the answer admits 0r leaves undenied the material facts stated in
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When

a case

is

decided upon a motion 0n the pleadings, for the purpose of any appeal 0f

that decision, the appellate court

citing

Davenport

Idaho 21

v.

must accept as true the

appellants' allegations. See, Jones, supra,

Burke, 27 Idaho 464, 473, 149 P. 511, 515 (1915). In Sterling

v.

Bloom, 111

723 P.2d 755 (1986), the Court held that where the District Court decided the case 0n a

1,

motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant
allegations

t0

Rule

12(0), I.R.C.P., the

movingparty admits

all

0f the opposing party's pleadings, and concomitantly, admits the untruth 0f its own

allegations which has been denied, citing t0 Davenport

In Smith

v.

Smith, et

al,

Burke, supra (1915).

v.

160 Idaho 780, 379 P.3d 1048 (2016), the Court held:

"I.R.C.P. 12(0) governs motions for

judgment on the pleadings.

By

its

terms, Rule

summary judgment. Thus, the
rulings on motions for summary

12(0) treats such motions similarly t0 motions for

standard of review applicable t0 lower courts'

judgment

also

judgment 0n the pleadings." Trimble

applies t0 motions for

v.

Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1997).

The Supreme Court

judgment on the pleadings

Will review a

reviews summary judgment proceedings. Bowles

v.

in the

same manner

summary judgment,

used by the

0n the motion. Union Paciﬁc Land Resources Corp.

court in ruling

it

Pro Indiviso, Ina, 132 Idaho 371, 374, 973 P.2d

142, 145 (1999). In reviewing a

trial

as

the appellate Court employs the

same review
v.

Shoshone

County Assessor, 140 Idaho 528, 531, 96 P.3d 629, 632 (2004).

Summary judgment
and

that the

moving

for

judgment

moving party

is

is

proper only

entitled t0 a

summary judgment

as a matter 0f law. Eliopulos

313 (1999).

See also

Hap

(2014), Golub

v.

v.

Taylor

there

is

no genuine issue

as to

any material

judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P.

carries the

(Ct.App.1992). See also Coghlan

P3d 1204

When

burden

v.

t0 establish

no genuine

fact

56(0).

The party

and

entitled t0

issue

Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988

Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300,

&

Sons,

Kirk—Scott, Ltd,

v.

Summerwind

(Supreme

Ct.
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Partners,

LLC, 157 Idaho 600, 338

January 30, 2015 N0. 41505), 342 P.3d

P. 15

893 (2015); Sims

v.

AC1 Northwest,

342 P.3d 618 (2015); Houpz‘

Ina, (Idaho Supreme Court N0. 41269, January 21, 2015),

Wells Fargo Bank,

v.

NA. (Supreme

Court N0. 41990), March

2016, 2016 Opinion N0. 28, 370 P.3d 384 (2016).; Forbush et al

Properly Owners’ Association, Inc.

LLC v VP Ina,

et al ,162

9,

Sagecrest Multi Family

v.

Idaho 317, 396 P.3d 1199 (2017); Valiant Idaho,

164 Idaho,314, 429 P.3d 855 (2018).

In this action, the analysis

ownership 0f Decedent’s
vested With both

title

assets; as

is

the application of law t0 the issue

it is

0f

titled

and

vested

the heirs, not the ﬁduciary, as statutorily declared t0 be

and possession. This appellate court must decide whether Hillen, who claims

“ownership” has a right to take and
controversial Instrument entered

sell

property as the “owner”, based upon an erroneous and

by a magistrate on June

2,

2017, and Whether such an Order Will be

allowed t0 defeat the statutory rights 0f the heirs?

V.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED

ON APPEAL

In the absence 0f any established and demonstrated need for the liquidation 0f assets

of an

in the administration

estate,

as determined

under

I.

C. §15-3-711, does a

personal representative have any authority Within the general provisions 0f the Idaho

Uniform Probate Code, I. C. §§15-1-101 et seq. (UPC), to eject Appellant VKSIII
from his otherwise lawful possession 0f property that by law (I. C. §15-3-101) is
vested in the heirs 0f the Estate, and his presence is deemed essential by the 2/3rds
heir?

2.

a personal representative ever "own" estate property, as opposed
to taking and holding "possession" 0f that property in trust for the beneﬁt of creditors

Under

the

UPC, can

in satisfaction

3.

have any authority t0 transfer "ownership"
a personal representative by means of a Rule 70(b), I.R.C.P. order?

Does a magistrate
of property to

4.

of their claims?

Does

in a probate proceeding

the "conclusive evidence" standard

personal representative's pleading,

opposed

announced

made upon

to a pleading t0 obtain "possession"

in

I.

C. §15-3-709 apply to a

alleged "ownership" 0f property, as

of property, for satisfaction 0f creditor

claims as an estate administration necessity, t0 which the "conclusive evidence"
standard

5.

was intended

If Hillen is

deemed

t0

t0 apply

under that section?

be the sole owner of Decedent’s property, as a consequence 0f
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on What basis does Hillen remain subj ect t0 the statutorilyobligations he owes to Decedent’s heir whose interest has been allegedly
result 0f the entry 0f the Rule 70(b) Order?

the Rule 70(b) Order, then
stated trust

divested as

deemed

be the sole owner of Decedent’s property as a consequence of
the Rule 70(b) Order, then 0n What basis does the “divested” heir, Vernon K. Smith,
retain standing to challenge or seek restraint of the unauthorized actions attempted by
Hillen to sell the heirs’ property without any showing of necessity Which becomes a
If Hillen is

6.

to

factual dispute?

Whether VKSIII is entitled t0 an award of costs, and preserve the
should VKSIII prevail on this appeal?

7.

issue 0f attorney

fees,

ARGUMENT PRESENTED ON THESE ISSUES ON APPEAL

VI.

On

February 10, 2020, the lower Court issued the Order Granting Hillen’s motions for

Partial

Judgment 0n the Pleadings, Certiﬁcation, and Writ of Assistance

252;),

based upon Hillen’s assertion he

is

the “sole

(C1. R. pp. 158-180;

owner” 0f Decedent’s property,

asserted in the Gibson matter (Hillen v Gibson, Docket N0. 47687-2020,

CV01—19-10368.

J.

judicial notice of the

In re Estate

fact,

was

the sole

Rule 70(b) Instrument. This appellate court has

as a result of the

Rule 70(b) Instrument, as

just as he

Ada County Case N0.

Steven Hippler, however, never declared that Hillen, in

owner of Decedent’s Property

228—

it

omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6

was referenced
(2018),,

in the

Supreme Court Decision

and made part of this record

in several

areas ofthis appeal (C1. R. pp. 16-21; 82-95; 112-121; 172-180).

The lower Court
that the

in this case stated in

Rule 70(b) Judgment was

its

at issue in the appeal”. (C1. R. 160, 229),

the basis for granting the motion for

Hillen

is

Raymond

the

and then

stated, as

Judgment 0n the Pleadings: “Here, the plain language of the

Rule 70(b) Judgment vested in Hillen “any and
Virtue of the plain

Order: “The Supreme Court speciﬁcally noted

all real

property of any kind or nature. Thus, by

and un-ambiguous statutory language and the Rule 70(b) Order and Judgment,

owner

(in his capacity as the Personal Representative

Street property

and has authority

t0 eject

0f Victoria’s Estate) of the

Vernon [VKSIII].”
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(C1. R. p. 166; 235).

This

lower Court

is

relying

upon

the Rule 70(b) Instrument,

which

directly conﬂicts With the Statute

0n ownership under the provisions of the UPC, and approached
Steven Hippler did in the Gibson case, where

So contrary
“title”

t0

J.

Steven Hippler

owner over the Gowen

absolute

somewhat

differently that

J.

stated:

Gibson’s position, the fact that the statute gives a “power” instead 0f

does not matter—even Without holding

Amended Memo.

it

Dec., p. 5, C1.

have the power of an
Property, Which includes determining Who can occupy it.
R. p.133 0f the Gibson appeal) (bold/underlined emphasis
title,

Hillen

would

still

added).

Ownership does matter,

as

it is

Whether the Rule 70(b) Instrument

fundamental t0 an

is valid,

ej ectment

action,

and

void, 0r erroneously applied, as

comes down

it

it is

t0

imprudently

being used t0 over-ride the statutory declaration of ownership, and confusing the ﬁduciary
requirement t0 establish a necessity before taking possession of property from an heir and his
protecting occupants. If there are n0 creditors outstanding, the ﬁduciary cannot take possession
just for the sake of

it.

VKSIII and

his counsel

Vernon, the statutory heir t0 2/3rds 0f the

Decedent’s assets, has taken strong exception to the mis-guided analysis, as Hillen cannot be

determined an “owner” 0f the property, as a matter of law (Lemp

v.

222, (1919)), nor can he exercise a right t0 “possession” under the

UPC, without demonstrating

necessity,

limited

by

Where

here,

none

exists, as

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 184

any grant 0f a “power” over property

the trust obligations to the heirs under the

is

a

power

that

P.

a

is

Uniform Probate Code (UPC).

This Rule 70(b) Instrument Hillen has relied upon for ejectment, under his complaint and

motion for judgment upon the pleadings,
and

this court

statutory

must declare

this

is

a claim to “ownership” contradicted

is

the Statute,

imprudent entry 0f the Rule 70(b) Instrument cannot trump the

scheme 0f ownership of Decedent’s

There

by

assets, vested

With the

heirs.

a signiﬁcant distinction arising out 0f the statutory limitations placed

exercise 0f a “power”

by a personal

representative, as

opposed
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t0 Hillen’s claim

he

upon

is

the

the sole

“owner” 0f Decedent’s property. Hillen has n0 statutory authorization
statutory ownership interest, let alone a magistrate seek to take

LLC Without due process
If Hillen

were

t0

any

to divest the heir’s

interests

of VHS Properties,

of law and upon a lack 0f personal jurisdiction. Both are invalid.

be declared the “sole owner”,

t0 the exclusion

in the heirs, along With the attempt to defeat the interest

0f

VHS

of any ownership interest

Properties,

LLC, When

the

Magistrate had n0 personal jurisdiction over that entity and denial of due process 0f law, then

does that void Instrument allow Hillen t0 freely d0 with that property as he pleases, n0 longer
acting as the personal representative subject t0 the limitations

If Hillen

mandated by the

were the “sole owner” 0f Decedent’s property,

heirs or the remaining rights of

VHS

Properties,

the statutory trust obligation t0 the heirs, nor

UPC?

to the exclusion

of Decedent’s

LLC, then Hillen no longer would be

would he remain

subject t0

subj ect t0 the heirs’ corresponding

statutory right t0 restrain his unauthorized actions (LC. § 15-3-607), 0r an heirs’ statutorily right
t0 seek

damages

for Hillen’s breach 0f his ﬁduciary duty (LC. § 15-3-712).

These contentions would be a defense
Decedent’s property, as the heirs’

if

Hillen were

deemed

to

be the sole owner of

and

trust interest is effectively extinguished,

VHS

Properties’

ownership wrongfully defeated Without personal jurisdiction and in Violation of the required due
process 0f law, as

VHS

has never been a party in the probate proceedings.

Do

the heirs have the

standing t0 seek an order of restraint against Hillen, 0r seek damages for his breach of ﬁduciary

duty,

inasmuch as those statutory obligations would be eliminated by the

court’s

effects

of the lower

Rule 70(b) Instrument.
In contrast t0 ownership, if the property

was

actually placed

back With the Decedent,

Hillen could only seek possession t0 satisfy creditors 0r taxes, of Which there

Should Hillen receive possession,

it

is

only in

trust,
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is

neither to satisfy.

beneﬁt 0f creditors and other

interested persons,

and must otherwise protect the

interests

0f the

heirs.

This appeal requires the court t0 engage statutory interpretation t0 determine the issue 0f

ownership of a Decedent’s assets upon death, and to address the law that determines the Rule 70(b)
Instrument entered by a magistrate void for lack ofjurisdiction and denial of any due process as t0

VHS

Properties,

LLC, and

entered in contradiction 0f statutory authority. This Court must

determine in What manner a ﬁduciary can take possession of an heirs’ statutory ownership of

Decedent’s

assets,

entering any

some

is

a Rule 70(b) Instrument

Judgment 0r order exceeds the

entities,

interests

and t0 What extent

rendered void,

When a magistrate

statutory authority, lacks personal jurisdiction over

and denies due process required under the law When attempting

0f others. There was not only a contradiction of the

authority to place

afforded t0

is

VHS

title

statute

to

impugn

the

and complete lack of statutory

with Hillen, but no personal jurisdiction over and n0 due process 0f law

Properties,

LLC by

this Magistrate,

perceived under the law to be a void and

unenforceable Instrument, and With respect t0 a 2/3rds heir and his authorized occupant, VKSIII,

this

Instrument that has granted Hillen his basis to claim ownership

Statute, all

is

of Which remains challenged by Appellant and the 2/3““

statutory interpretation

in direct conﬂict with the

heir,

placing the proper

of “ownership” of a Decedent’s assets and the voidness of the Rule 70(b)

Instrument to be squarely at issue, as the enforceability of the Rule 70(b) Instrument

upon which this

Partial

Judgment 0n the Pleadings was

is

the basis

entered.

This appellate Court must determine Whether the Legislature and the issue 0f statutory
ownership, and the well-established case law on the issue of a void Judgments, impact the authority

and impose limitations upon

manner Lemp

v.

this

Personal Representative, and this Court Will determine in what

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 184

P. 222, (1919)

remains t0 be applied,

historically identiﬁed.
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if differently

than

Because

this

appeal requires the court apply the law in respect t0 statutory interpretation and

the ownership of a Decedent’s property, and

What

is

the established law

0n void judgments,

this

court Will address the issues under the standard of free review. Several recent cases address

statutory interpretation,

86,

St.

Alphonsus Regional Medical Center

356 P.3d 377, 379 (2015) and the general rule of

summarized

in

Hoﬂer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho

“The objective 0f statutory
v.

v.

Gooding County, 159 Idaho

statutory interpretation

interpretation

Court begins With the

sufﬁciently

870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016), stating:

is

to give effect to legislative intent.” State

“When

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007).

statute, the

was

84,

literal

words 0f the

statute.

.”
.

.

interpreting a

Williams

v.

Blue

Cross ofldaho, 151 Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 (2011). “If the statutory
language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent 0f the legislative body must be

Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnly. Bd. oquualization, 157
Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
St. Luke’s Reg’ l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. 0fC0mm ’rs ofAda Cnly., 146 Idaho 753, 755,
given

effect.

.”

.

.

203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This Court does not have the authority t0 modify an
unambiguous legislative enactment. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’ l Med. Ctr., 151
Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011) (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170,

380 P.3d

177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013(1962)). 160 Idaho at 884,

E.

at

695.

The Supreme Court Decision In Re Estate omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6
(2018) Has Not Conﬁrmed — And Was Without Authority T0 Conﬁrm —
Hillen As The Sole Lawful Owner Of The Decedent’s Assets
Appellant contends the Rule 70(b) Instrument

statutory

authority t0

divest heirs

0f

their

is

statutory

void, as the magistrate did not have

ownership, and more disturbing, the

Magistrate lacked personal jurisdiction over, and never afforded any due process t0
Properties,

LLC, an

cannot hold

title t0

never been a party in

entity that has

this

VHS

probate matter. Furthermore, Hillen

any property of Decedent, as a matter 0f law.

When

there are

n0

creditor

claims and n0 interested party in the estate t0 require liquidation 0f an asset, there exists n0 statutory
authority to take possession

relying

upon an Instrument

from an

heir,

and Hillen cannot become the “exclusive

titled

owner” by

that violates the statute, the well-established case law, relying
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on an

Instrument that lacks jurisdictional authority under the statute to disrupt the devolution 0f a

Decedent’s property interests or others Without due process 0f law.

The conduct of a court
in State

v.

acting in excess of statutorily-conferred authority has been addressed

Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731

(Ct.

App. 2008)

stating the issue as follows:

[C]0urts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction

mean simply

when

they

committed error because the action that was
taken did not comply With governing law. For example, our appellate courts have
referred to a lack 0f “jurisdiction” when perhaps more precisely meaning that a
motion or complaint was not timely ﬁled, that a condition precedent t0 the right to
ﬁle the action was not satisﬁed, or that governing statutes 0r court rules did
not authorize the particular decision made bv the court. (citations omitted)
146 Idaho at 375, 195 P.3d at 734 (bold/underlined emphasis, and parenthetical

really

that the court

reference t0 “citations omitted,” added).

Armstrong

Cited t0 California’s

Supreme Court

in

People

v.

American Contractors

Indemnity Ca, 33 Cal.4th 653, 16 Ca1.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004), wherein a court, acting
contrary t0 authority conferred by statute, has acted in excess 0f its iurisdiction. 146 Idaho at
376, 195 P.3d at 735.

Our Supreme
(201 1)

As

Court, in State

and

authority.1 Courts

demonstrated in State

v.

v.

v.

It

Court

the

be void.

0f Appeals

differentiated

between

580

n.2,

13, 15,

319 P.3d 497, 499

288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2

(Ct.

(Ct.

App. 2014), and

App. 2012).

remains neither rational nor judicially prudent for a Magistrate to carry into effect

what Hillen has advocated

to

be his “ownership” of property that by Idaho law he

from owning, given the prohibition

in

Lemp

v.

(19 1 9), declaring “The administrator or executor

1

to

have authoritatively cited Armstrong subsequent t0 Hartwig,

Vaughn, 156 Idaho

Steelsmith, 154 Idaho 577,

must be held

Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979, 982 n.3

acknowledged Armstrong—where

jurisdiction

State

such, this Rule 70(b) Instrument

Until superseded

by a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court,

Appeals are binding precedent upon lower Idaho

courts. State

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184
is

not the owner ofany part ofthe

precluded

P. 222,

223

estate.

upon the same question, opinions of the Idaho Court of
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986-87, 842 P.2d 660, 665—66 (1992).

as issued
v.

is
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Signiﬁcant constitutional issues arise
third parties are

impugned by a magistrate

personal jurisdiction over

when

substantive due process rights of heirs and

acting in contradiction 0f statutory authority, lacking

some and no due process

t0 non-party participants.

BHA

Property interests cannot simply be taken by a Court in Violation of due process.
Investments, Inc.

v.

City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (2004).

a void Order or Judgment

is

characterized as a taking in Violation 0f the 14th

United States Constitution. Seaboard Air Line Ry. C0.
1921).

Any

v.

Any

upon

act

Amendment to

the

Fowler, 275 F. 239, 240 (W.D.N.C.,

continued enforcement 0f a “void” Instrument constitutes a “taking” 0f property

interests, speciﬁcally

entity denied

offending the statutorily vested interests of an heir 0f a Decedent and an

0f due process.

Amendment Violations,

The lack 0f due

combined With the

process,

5th

and

14th

defeats the pretext 0f an enforceable Judicial decree.

Hillen has sought to act

upon

this statutorily un—authorized, constitutionally defective,

and jurisdictionally void Rule 70(b) Instrument. This can only be Viewed

as a

knowing

act

of

mal-feasance, as Hillen accepted the appointment as a personal representative under the

restrictions

and limitations formulated within the UPC, and took an oath

responsibility Within the

S. Ct.

as declared in

1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley

(1871), and Sierra Life Ins. C0.

Vernon sought

perform a statutory

conﬁnes of the Uniform Probate Code, and not as a Chapter 7 Trustee.

While the defects remain of concern,
98

to

to correct this

v.

v.

Stump

v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

Fisher 13 Wall. 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646

Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627, 586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978),

unintended consequence of the erroneous mechanism used by the

Magistrate to perpetuate needless damages t0 the heirs and the disrupted interests of the third

parties

damaged by

Hillen’s un—authorized activity, and this court has the inherent authority t0

declare void the Rule 70(b) Instrument.

The entry has violated
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the constitution with the denial

of due process and lack 0f jurisdiction over the third-party

entity, in addition t0 defeating the

vested interest 0f the heirs. The Magistrate cannot alter the statutory vestiture of property

ownership emanating from the demise of a Decedent to someone
Decedent’s property. This Court must declare Hillen’s

Who

cannot

ﬂawed and misplaced

own any

part of

interpretation,

and

void any un-constitutional interpretation 0f the ownership restoration. In Sierra Life

Ins.

Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627, 586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978), Idaho addressed the effects

When there

is

C0.

v.

lack of personal jurisdiction and due process, stating:

“Furthermore, because 0f the serious ramiﬁcations and consequences Which
could follow from a court acting Without jurisdiction over the subject matter, we
recognize that it is important t0 keep that concept clearly deﬁned. For example,
the defense 0f lack 0f iurisdiction over the subiect matter is never waived
(LR.C.P. 12(h)); purported judgments entered bv a court without iurisdiction
over the subiect matter are void and as such are subject t0 collateral attack,
and are not entitled t0 recognition in other states under the full faith and credit
clause 0f the United States Constitution (Restatement 0f Judgments, § 7
(194222. In addition, judges who act Without jurisdiction over the subject

matter may be liable for damages in civil actions. Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335,
20 L.Ed. 646 (1871).
Relief from void Instruments

Engineering, Ina,
2006).

Cuevas
also

A

v.

is

not a discretionary principle under the law. See McClure

Channel 5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 953, 155 P.3d 1189, 1192

void judgment can be attacked

v.

Burns

at

App.

any time by any person adversely affected by

it.

Barraza, 277 P.3d 337, 341 (2012), Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 38493. See
v.

Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). This Court has addressed

void judgments in Hartman

v.

United Heritage Prop.

&

340, 344 (2005); and the basis of a void Instrument

Family Trust

v.

Cas. C0., 141 Idaho 193, 197, 108 P.3d

is

identiﬁed in Jim

&

Maryann Plane

Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 933, 342 P.3d 639, 645 (2015), being lack of personal

jurisdiction, lack

of subj ect matter jurisdiction, and a Violation 0f due process.

These defects are present in
statutorily

(Ct.

this

Rule 70(b) Instrument, as the Instrument violates the

mandated devolution 0f a Decedent’s property; the magistrate has n0
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jurisdictional

authority to divest an heir;

afford

it

had n0 personal jurisdiction over

any due process;

jurisdictionally defective

that

VHS

Properties,

LLC

and

failed t0

ownership cannot be defeated by an un-constitutional and

Rule 70(b) Instrument by a Magistrate that exceeds both the power

and statutory authority.

No

Magistrate, acting With a judicious objective, and in a judicial capacity as a judge,

exercising thoughtful jurisprudence,

mandated devolution 0f ownership
code, vesting interests t0

interests

would engage

interests

in

an intentional Violation of the statutory

0f Decedent’s property required under the probate

someone other than mandated within

the Statute, or defeating the

of a third party without due process 0r in personum jurisdiction over the

magistrate

may deny due

entity.

N0

process, avoid required jurisdiction, or deliberately defy the statutory

mandates 0f property ownership 0f a decedent’s heirs

Vernon

is

a 2/3““

owner 0f

UPC, and Vernon wants VKSIII
in-kind distribution

t0

assets

owned by Decedent, pursuant

remain in possession of the

t0 the provisions

Raymond

Street property, as

would place VKSIII presence within Vernon’s 2/3““ share of

The Complaint ﬁled by

Hillen, seeking

to Hillen’s desire t0 sell

and liquidate any property.

ej ectment,

was never pursued

0f the

the property.

as a “necessary condition”

In any Action for ejectment, the ﬁrst essential element to be alleged and proven
Plaintiff has

“ownership” 0f the property

at issue.

by

is

See Ada County Highway Dist. v Total

Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), wherein
requires proof 0f (1) ownership, (2) possession

an

it

holds that “Ejectment

the defendants, and (3) refusal 0f the

defendants t0 surrender possession.
Hillen, in his attempt to satisfy this fundamental element required, asserted he held

“ownership”, given his use 0f the Rule 70(b) Instrument on “ownership” of Decedent’s property
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Here

interests.

lies Hillen’s

but the law won’t allow

property—putting

conundrum. He wants

him

t0 sell the property,

he can demonstrate he

that right t0 eject unless

at issue the enforceability/voidness

wants

t0 eject everyone,

is

the

owner 0f the

0f the Rule 70(b) Instrument.

Hillen argues, as a consequence of the magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Instrument, he has

become

the “sole lawful

owner 0f the Decedent’s property.”

Hillen’s argument

Supreme Court, pursuant

is

untenable, for reasons that both the lower court, and the Idaho

to the

UPC,

are

bound by

personal representative by the legislature over

the limited power and authority granted to a

title

t0 the heirs’ property, as a

power and

authority exists only t0 the extent necessary for the administration 0f that property in the interests

of creditors and other interestedpersons.

Comment”

“Ofﬁcial
than

title,

as

title

t0

t0

LC.

§ 15-3-711

I.C.

§§ 15-3-703, 15-3-709, and 15-3-711. See

The Personal Representative receives a ‘power,’

Decedent’s property, as a matter of law,

is

e.g.,

rather

vested in the devisees 0r heirs

immediately upon death of the decedent, conﬁrmed t0 be the controlling law by the Idaho

Supreme Court. See Ellmaker

Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390 (2015) and Fairchild

v.

Fairchild, 147 Idaho 147, 676 P.2d 722 (1984). These cases explicitly control this issue.

Statute,

Which vests

“title” t0 all

property

at the

decedent’s death, conﬁrms that

and vests with the heirs and devisees upon death of the decedent. See

I.

title

v.

The

passes t0

C. §15-3-101. The case

authority (Ellmaker and Fairchild, supra), expressly declare that "legal title t0 decedent’s

property vests in the heirs or devisees upon the death of the decedent",
authoritative reference to Colorado, another state that has adopted the

UPC,

citing

further

citing Pierce

v.

Francis, 194 P.3d 505, 510 (Colo. App. 2008).
Fairchild, supra, declared

....,

who

all

became cotenants

“The

trial

court had found

leaving as her heirs her children

in the thirteen acres in question."
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We View the

statement that

"all

became cotenants"
fact.

See

I.C.

as a conclusion of law, reached

by applying

existing

law

to the

§15-2-103 (concerning the share of the decedent’s heirs); and

ﬁndings of

I.C. §

15-3-101

(decedent’s property devolves to his heirs at death).

“Heirs” are statutory beneﬁciaries in an “Intestate” proceeding
“devisees” are statutory beneﬁciaries in a “Testate” proceeding

statutory declaration,

(I.

C. §15-1-201(12), and

C.

(I.

§15-1-201(22).

By

devolution of property interests vest immediately upon death of the

decedent in the heirs or devisees, whichever the situation

may

be,

not t0 0r upon any

administrator, 0r personal representative.

Notwithstanding the magistrate’s all-encompassing language within the Rule 70(b)
Order, the effect can neither exceed, nor expand the limited scope of the statutory

power and

authority granted t0 a personal representative in the administration 0f a decedent’s estate, as

provided by

I.C.

§§ 15-3—701

et seq.

and 15-3-901

et seq..

Hillen has asserted that as a result of the entry 0f the Magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Instrument,

he

states

Plainitff,

Smith

“The controversy presently before the Court

Noah G.

owns

the Estate property Defendant

currently possesses” (See, Partial

certain

down

to a single issue:

Whether

Hillen (“Hillen”), as Personal Representative of the Estate 0f Victoria H.

(the “Estate”),

Introduction)

boils

Judgment

whereupon Hillen then

judgment—afﬁrmed by

the

Memo

Vernon K. Smith

at p.

1;

and

his

says: Hillen does

Supreme Court—that

Cl.

III

R. p. 51,

ownership

is

(“Defendant”)

1“ sentence of

evidenced by that

the Honorable Cheri C.

Copsey

(“Probate Court”) entered in the probate of the late Victoria H. Smith’s Estate (“Estate Case”)

(See, Partial

Judgment

Memo

at p. 1; C1.

R. p. 51, 2nd sentence of Introduction) This assertion

an aberration 0f the law, and such a result not only

is

in contradiction t0

— but has

is

the unintended

consequence 0f exceeding — the express limitations placed upon the authority 0f a personal
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representative as declared

(UPC). See

by

the Idaho Legislature in

In the Matter

e.g.,

ochme Doe II,

its

adoption 0f the Uniform Probate Code

160 Idaho 360, 362, 372 P.3d 1106, 1108 (2016)

(“‘The legislature and the legislature only, under our constitution, has the power to legislate.”)
(parenthetical reference added).

No
to the

issue

was presented

for decision

— nor was any

issue actually decided

— on

the appeal

Idaho Supreme Court in Estate 0f Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018), to either

eliminate the legal

the Idaho

title

that passed to the heirs as a matter

Supreme Court declare the

conﬁrm such an Instrument

of law under LC.

§

15-3-101, nor did

enforceability or effect 0f the Rule 70(b) Order, let alone t0

effectively ousted the Decedent’s heirs 0f their statutory

t0 the

title

Decedent’s property, and t0 substitute in their place, a personal representative, Hillen, as the sole

and lawful owner 0f a Decedent’s property, not
due process to

The

t0

mention the lack ofjurisdiction and denial 0f

VHS Properties, LLC.

issues presented t0 the

Supreme Court

for determination

on

bifurcated appeal were two; the invalidation of the holographic will and the
transfers” 0f Decedent’s property

by

the July 4,

2012

transfer t0

VHS

that portion

“power of attorney

Properties,

LLC. No

questions were presented, certainly not the validity of the Rule 70(b) Instrument, as
ripe for

any adjudication on

that appeal concerning the Will

other question of any determination 0f

title t0

0f the

it

other

was not

and use 0f the power. There was no

the Decedent’s property as provided

by the Idaho

UPC?
N0

issues

were raised nor decided on

that appeal construing the

Rule 70(b) Instrument,

2

The Rule 70(b) Order was sought for the purpose 0f restoring prior ownership t0 Decedent, not to convey
ownership t0 a personal representative. The Idaho Supreme Court neither addressed, nor decided, any issue other
than the power of attorney and Decedent’s Will. The Supreme Court’s primary reference t0 the Rule 70(b) Order 0n
was t0 use reference to that Order as a demarcation point in deﬁning those claims Which encompassed the
time period in the scope of the bifurcated appeal. “This appeal follows the parties’ stipulation to bifurcate the appeal
the appeal

to ﬁrst address

any matters occurring up

to the post—trial

judgment under Rule 70(b) Order before considering

matters thereafter.” 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15.
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itself,

as the ownership 0f Decedent’s interests

UPC,

the

despite

What

were raised or decided

>

is

were perceived

being contended by Hillen.

On

t0

the

be made upon the provisions 0f

Supreme Court appeal no

issues

to the effect that:

was made the sole “owner” 0f the Estate property,
granted a power and possession, in trust, for the beneﬁt 0f
provided by the UPC;
Hillen

as

opposed

to being

the Estate’s heirs, as

The “divestment” language of the Rule 70(b) Order was intended to accomplish
anything more than a transfer back t0 Decadent properties earlier transferred;
Vernon K. Smith was divested 0f all of his interest in the property 0f the
which he received as a matter 0f law under I.C. § 15-3-101;

As

estate,

was n0 longer subject t0
imposed under the UPC, upon his actions as a

a result of the entry 0f the Rule 70(b) Order Hillen

any 0f the

constraints, as otherwise

personal representative; and

As

a result 0f the entry 0f the Rule 70(b) Order Hillen

was

free t0

proceed With a

of the Estate property, Without reference t0 any necessity for the
disposition 0f that property in the interest 0f creditors and others who might have
full liquidation

a legitimate interest in the administration 0f the Estate.

It

n0

remains undisputed

creditors

—

at the

either secured 0r

time of Victoria’s death 0n September 11, 2013, there were

unsecured — as Vernon resolved any and

all

debts, liabilities

and

controversaries long before the death of the Decedent. There were no creditors for the beneﬁt of

which Hillen would have been required

0f setting aside any transfers that had

to act for purposes

been made by decedent (0r as made on her behalf by use 0f Vernon’s POAs), as there was n0
alleged fraud of any creditors’ interests, as none existed. LC. § 15-3-710.
the Decedent’s Estate —0ther than the

and

his extended cadre

payment of excessive

fees

The only obligation of

and expenses churned by Hillen

0f attorneys grossly churning legal fees —has been What emerged in the

course of Hillen’s controversial administration, with the payment 0f federal estate taxes, which
taxes have been fully paid, with

n0 penalties

t0

be assessed for the delay caused through Hillen’s

administration.
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Vernon, both as a 2/3““ heir and as VKSIII’S counsel, vehemently opposed not only any
sale,

but Hillen’s Motion for partial Judgment 0n the Pleadings, based upon his imprudent claim

to ownership,

1.

and given the

critical legal restraints

and propositions

that includes:

Hillen has limited authority to act on behalf 0f creditors, and persons interested in
the estate, Without any

provisions

0f the

power or

UPC

authority to blatantly ignore, or to thwart, the express

concerning the rights 0f heirs arising out 0f intestate

Where title and ownership 0f a Decedent’s assets
upon death.

succession,
the heirs

vests immediately in

That neither the lower Court, nor the Supreme Court, can act in excess

0f,

0r attempt

t0 expand, the limited statutory authority granted a personal representative

UPC, being

the exclusive source

from Which authority

is

by

the

granted by the Idaho

Legislature.

The December, 2018 decision 0f

Supreme Court has binding precedential effect
and decided 0n that appeal, and did not
address the voidness 0f the Rule 70(b) Instrument, which can be collaterally
the

only as arising out of issues actually raised

attacked at anytime.

T0 A Decedent’s Property Is Limited
Those Actions Necessary T0 Protect The Rights Of Creditors Or Other

F. Authority
t0

Of Hillen T0 Act

In Respect

Interested Parties

Under

I.C.

§15-3-101, the

t0 successors identiﬁed

UPC

speciﬁcally states “Estates immediately descend at death

by any probated

will, or to heirs if

no

Will

is

probated, subject to rights

which may be implemented through administration.” See, “Ofﬁcial Comment” LC. §15-3-101,
subsection

(1),

ﬁnal sentence (underlined emphasis added); and as held in Hintz

v.

Black, 125

Idaho 655, 659, 873 P.2d 909, 913 (Ct.App.1994) (“[T]he assets were subject t0 recoupment by
the Personal Representative, if required in order t0 satisfy estate liabilities. I.C. §15-3-709.”)

(Emphasis added). 125 Idaho
administration of the estate

at

659, 873 P.2d at 913. Absent any need arising out of the

— being

the interests of creditors,

0f which there are none —

the

property of Decadent passes at the death of the decedent t0 devisees and heirs, as a matter 0f law,

and remains there pursuant

t0 I.C. §15-3-10 1

,

subj ect to in-kind distribution.
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LC. §15-3-101

is

repetitively referenced within Chapter 3 provisions Within the

Which address the powers of the personal

709 (“Section 3-101 provides for the devolution of
status

make

unnecessary to discuss the

acquires”); “Ofﬁcial

heirs

3-101

and devisees

Comment”

at the

except t0

‘title’

I.C.

on

title

of the personal representative With reference to

it

See, “Ofﬁcial

representative.

‘title’

t0 decedent’s assets

death.

Comment” LC.

in a

way

how

that should

his personal representative

§15-3-901 (“Title t0 a decedent’s property passes t0 his

time 0f his death. See Section 3-101. This Section adds

indicate

§15-3-

Section 3-711 deﬁnes the

and ‘power’

which

UPC

may

successors

establish

record

title

little

absence

the

in

t0 Section

0f

administration”).

“Ofﬁcial

Comment”

distribution in kind.

feasible

and

It

I.C.

§15-3-906

(“This

section

directs a personal representative t0

t0 convert assets t0 cash only

where there

establishes

make

is

a

preference

whenever

distribution in kind

a Special reason for doing

provides a reasonable means for determining value 0f assets distributed in kind.

It is

for

so.

It

implicit in

Section 3-101, 3-901 and this section that each residuary beneﬁciary’s basic right

is to

his

proportionate share of each asset constituting the residue.”). (Emphasis added)

The “Ofﬁcial Comment”
between the ownership

interests

The personal
title.”

He

of the heirs and the

receives a “power,

if the

power

devisees and heirs.

is

§15-3-711 states most clearly the intended relationship

representative

the succession 0f assets

Thus,

t0 I.C.

”

is

of Hillen:

given the broadest possible “power over

rather than

Which

trust responsibilities

title,

because the power concept eases

are not possessed

unexercised prior to

its

by

the personal representative.

termination,

Purchasers from devisees 0r heirs

its

who

lapse clears the

title

are “distributees”

0f

may

be protected also by Section 3-910. The power over title 0f an absolute owner is
conceived t0 embrace all possible transactions Which might result in a conveyance
0r encumbrance 0f assets, or in a change of rights of possession.
the personal representative t0 the estate

0f a

The

relationship

Hence, personal
0f
creditors 0r successors 0f a personal representative cannot avail themselves 0f his
title

to

trustees.

any greater extent than
Interestedpersons

is

is

that

true generally

who are apprehensive
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a personal representative

may

secure themselves by use 0f the devices implicit in
the several sections ofParts I and 3 0fthis Article. See especially Sections 3-501,

3-605, 3-607

and 3-611.0fﬁcial Comment

Idaho adopted the

UPC

rule a personal representative

is

t0 I.C. §15-3-71

1.

(Emphasis added)

and became effective 1971, maintaining the then-existing Idaho
never considered an “owner” 0f Decedent’s property, which had

been the law in Idaho since the Territory’s ﬁrst adoption the probate code in 1864. See, Laws 0f
the Territory 0f Idaho, First Sess., Probate Practice Act, § 116, pp. 345-46, as codiﬁed at LC. §

15-410

at the

time 0f

1971. See also

as

it

Lemp

its

v.

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 184

existed prior t0 the adoption 0f the

UPC,

P. 222, (1919),

the Idaho

estate.

Under

He, in his ofﬁcial character, only holds

it

01"

in

the Idaho Probate Code,

Supreme Court (Lemp

397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919)), held: “The administrator

part 0f the

Uniform Probate Code (UPC)

repeal and the enactment 0f the Idaho

executor

is

v.

Lemp, 32 Idaho

not the owner ofany

in trust for the parties entitled t0

it,

subject t0 the purposes of administration.” (Emphasis added)

This “trust relationship” between Hillen and heirs owning Decedent’s property has been
carried forward Within the current provisions of the

by use 0f the qualifying phrase,
the unqualiﬁed declaration

that,

Allen

“in-trust

made

UPC,

however,” within that

in the “Ofﬁcial

Comment”

“The relationship of the personal representative
v.

as set out in the text of I.C. §15-3-711

statute

t0 that

and as further cemented

same section

t0 the estate is that

in

t0 the effect

0f a trustee.” See

e.g.,

Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 35, 665 P.2d 1041, 1045 (1983) (“[T]he personal representative

exercises control over the property of the estate, in her ﬁduciary capacity, until the close 0f

administration of the estate.”

“possession” —n0t

title

(italicized

emphasis in

—to Estate property. Blake

v.

original)).

Hillen can only receive

Blake, 69 Idaho 214, 221, 205 P.2d 495,

499-500 (1949).

By

Virtue of this well-established case law, the misplaced assertions of Hillen,
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which

underlie his

Motion

for partial

Judgment on the Pleadings,

the proposition he

is

is

“owner” 0f

Decedent’s property, a legal impossibility, and therefore he cannot meet the elements of an
ejectment action. The Magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Instrument could never serve to oust an heir of
statutory ownership of Decedent’s property,

and such an interpretation

is

egregious, and a clear

misrepresentation as to the established precedent 0f our Supreme Court, and since

clearly erroneous,

advanced

either maliciously, 0r perceived to

misfeasance of the ﬁduciary capacity, as Hillen
applicable

is

it is

seen t0 be

be an act of gross negligence or

acting outside his ﬁduciary duty under the

UPC law, the uniform Idaho authority that Hillen has been sworn t0 uphold.

Hillen does not possess the required ownership interest necessary to pursue any action
for ejectment of

any occupant,

in this case

since 20064, and Hillen’s Motion,

court,

upon

VKSIII, continuously occupying

Raymond

the pleadings, should have been denied

by

Street

the lower

and must be reversed on appeal.

Nor Can He Be Authorized

Act By Court Order, In
Excess Of The Limited Authority Granted Under The UPC and Established bV

G. Hillen Cannot Act,

to

Idaho

Law

Hillen

is

statutorily

bound by

the limitations

t0

imposed by the UPC. The Ofﬁcial Comment

LC. §15-3-703 constrains a Personal Representative’s

acts

by

statutory authority in declaring

that:

derived from appointment by the public
as the Court. But the Code also makes it clear that the personal

“[A] personal representative’s authority

agency known

is

representative, in spite 0f the source 0f his authority,

is

to

proceed With the

administration, settlement and distribution 0f the estate by use Ofstatutory powers
and in accordance with statutory directions. See Sections 3-107 and 3-704...”

(Emphasis added).
Hillen’s Complaint to eject, alleging “ownership”,

is

acting entirely in excess of his

statutorily-conferred authority, perpetuating a falsehood With his erroneous claim that he “has
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been made” the “owner” 0f the Decedent’s property, as the effect 0f the Magistrate’s Rule 70(b)
Instrument was never intended t0 divest any heir 0f all statutorily-conferred
properly.

The Magistrate had

neither statutory

power nor jurisdictional

title t0

Decedent’s

authority to engage such

a result by exceeding the duty and obligation t0 uphold the statutes and constitution.

The question regarding a court
addressed above in State

v.

acting in excess 0f statutorily-conferred authority

was

American Contractors Indemnity

C0.,

Armstrong, supra; People

v.

33 Cal.4th 653, 16 Cal. Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004) (When a court acts contrary
conferred by statute,

it

Armstrong, 146 Idaho

at

acts in excess

0f

its

jurisdiction ...and

376, 195 P.3d at 735); State

v.

13, 15,

P.3d 132, 135 n.2

(Ct.

(Ct.

App. 2014) and State

v.

cited in

authority.3 Idaho Courts continued

upon Armstrong and Hartwig supra. See

319 P.3d 497, 499

void)

Hartwig, supra, Where Armstrong has

been embraced as the expression 0f a Court’s jurisdiction and
t0 authoritatively rely

may become

t0 authority

e.g.,

State

v.

Vaughn, 156 Idaho

Steelsmith, 154 Idaho 577,

580

n.2,

288

App. 2012)

Notwithstanding the magistrate’s language (in dereliction of the statutory declarations) in
the Rule 70(b) Instrument, and the Idaho

Supreme Court’s comment upon

that

Order (“In June

2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b),
vested

title to all

of Victoria’s real and personal property in the personal representative

been appointed.” 164 Idaho

at

466, 432 P.3d at

15

is

that

it

only had the intended

and because Victoria was deceased,

title

vested immediately in the heirs, and only upon showing 0f a necessity regarding
the limitations

3

imposed by authority granted

A decision of the Idaho

Supreme Court,

as issued

t0 a personal representative

upon the same

Appeals, until superseded, are binding precedent upon

all

who had

(emphasis added», the only lawful

construction applicable t0 this otherwise statutorily baseless Order

effect to restore title to the Decedent,

m

to her property

liabilities,

under

under the UPC, can

question, and opinions of the Idaho Court 0f

lower Courts. State

842 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1992).
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v.

Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986-87,

Hillen exercise those limited powers over the vested interests ofthe heirs. In the absence 0f such

a construction Which must be construed to restrict and limit the effect of the Rule 70(b)
Instrument, and the lower court has perpetuated an egregious error 0f the magistrate, as applied
in this matter as exceeding the grant

personal representative under the

H. The Decision

Pleadings

is

UPC.

Of The Idaho Supreme

N0 Authority T0
The question

0f statutory power and jurisdictional authority provided t0 a

Court, In

Re Estate Omeith,

Provides

Support Hillen’s Actions

raised and presented

by

Hillen’s

Motion

for partial

the issue 0f “ownership”, as Hillen seeks afﬁrmation

Judgment 0n the

from the lower

court, as a

consequence 0f the magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Instrument, and as a consequence of the subsequent
appeal taken t0 the Supreme Court, Hillen became the sole lawful owner 0f the Decedent’s
property.

N0

statute or case

law supports

This speciﬁc question, as

it

— Vernon and/or Joseph — of all

that title

and

Had

interest

and

interest entirely transferred t0 Hillen,

decided by the Supreme Court in
it

been seen

to

be

in

0f law.

concerns the effect 0f the Rule 70(b) Instrument, as divesting

the heirs

(2018).

that untenable position as a statement

its

title

was

in the

Decedent’s property, and having

neither raised,

decision In re Estate

made an

issue, argued, 0r

omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6

need 0f clarifying the controlling law, the Idaho precedent cited

above would have been entirely incorporated within the Decision, as there
authority to the contrary, thus rejecting such a bogus claim

now

is

n0 other case

being asserted by Hillen

regarding ownership. The issue 0f a void Judgment remains subject to collateral attack at any
time, notwithstanding the fact

In issuing

its

it

was not addressed

opinion, the

in the former appeal.

Supreme Court may have used in-opportune language

(as

highlighted in the quotation from that opinion set out below) in even referring t0 the Rule 70(b)
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Instrument, but in the context 0f the issues that were actually raised and decided 0n that appeal,

language

that inopportune

is t0

be treated as mere

dicta.

The following,

as included Within the

Idaho Supreme Court’s recitation 0f the factual and procedural background
express reference Within

its

is

the Court’s only

opinion t0 the Rule 70(b) Instrument:

In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant t0 Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 70(b), which vested title t0 all 0f Victoria’s real and personal property
in the personal representative

Vernon appealed these

Who had been

decisions,

and

appointed.

Court granted Joseph’s motion for

this

acceptance 0f appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 44.

This appeal follows the parties’ stipulation t0 bifurcate the

ﬁrst address any matters occurring up t0 and including the post-trial
judgment under Rule 70(b) before considering any matters occurring thereafter.

appeal

t0

The personal

representative 0f the estate, Intervenor-Respondent

not participating in this portion 0f the appeal. 164 Idaho

Noah

Hillen,

466, 432 P.3d

at

at

is

15

(emphasis added).
Hillen

would have been an

issue in the appeal. Hillen

interested party

was not

had the issue 0f vested

participating because he

had no

title

been made an

interest in the

two

issues

presented on appeal—the power and the validity 0f the Holographic Will. Hillen’s proposed
interpretation 0f the magistrate

from the heirs

to him,

would be

Rule 70(b) Order, as constituting an actual transfer 0f
in excess

of the statutory authority provided by the UPC, as

to a decedent’s property devolves t0 the heirs

only to possible subsequent divestment,
creditors

and

liabilities.

transfer of title

LC. §15-3-101.

from the

heirs to then

“title”

title

immediately upon death of the decedent, subject

if necessitated

There

is

no

by

the administration for the beneﬁt 0f

statutory grant of authority that permits a

become vested With

the Personal Representative of a

decedent’s Estate.

Court Judgments and decrees are subject to the same rules of interpretation as
construction 0f contracts.

McKoon

v.

Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925, 928 (2008)

A prominent rule 0f contract interpretation is that contracts must be
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interpreted in respect t0 the

then-existing law. Path t0 Health,

LLP

(“‘This Court has held that “it

axiomatic that extant law

every written

contract.

,9”,

is

(citations

v.

Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016)

statutes as they then existed

said, therefore,

and applied,”); and

in,

must be taken

In re Anderton

174 P.2d 212, 213 (1946) (noting that an executor must act “in
.”).

The Idaho UPC,

expressly

made

a part of

applied

t0

the

ofKaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206

interpretation 0f an appellate decision in, Application

P.2d 528, 533 (1949) (“What the court

written into and

Rule was

This

omitted).

is

’s

strict

in connection With the

Estate, 67 Idaho 160, 163,

compliance with the law

as in effect at the time 0f the referenced appeal in,

.

.

.

Matter 0f Estate 0f

Smith, supra, applies in the interpretation and application t0 both the Magistrate’s Rule 70(b)

Order and the Supreme Court’s Opinion 0n appeal.
Long-standing authority supports the interpretation 0f Idaho appellate decisions that
differentiates

between those issues

that

were actually raised and

that

were actually decided by the

Court, and other matters which were simply referred t0 in the decision. Bashore

Idaho 84, 88, 238 P. 534, 534 (1925) (“‘There
is

said in an opinion and What

See

also,

C.J.,

Adolf, 41

a pronounced line of demarcation between What

is

it.”

(citation omitted; italicized

Idaho Schools For Equal Educational Opportunity

P.2d 724, 737 (1993) (McDeVitt,

Farms

decided by

is

v.

v.

emphasis added)).

Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 586, 850

concurring and dissenting); North Side Canal C0.

C0,, 60 Idaho 748, 758, 96 Idaho 232, 235-36 (1939);

and Stark

v.

v.

Idaho

McLaughlin, 45 Idaho

112, 123, 261 P. 244, 245 (1927).

This long-standing principle of interpretation as applied to Idaho appellate Opinions, as

based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Bashore

by Idaho’s U.S.

District

Court

in,

AMX Intern,

1087, 1091-92 (D. Idaho 2010), and

Hash

v.

Inc.

U.S.,

v.

v.

Adolf, supra, has been recently applied

Battelle

Energy Alliance, 744 F.Supp.2d

454 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072 (D. Idaho 2006)
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(“The Idaho Supreme Court
in the light

itself has stated that its

Opinions “must be considered and construed

0f the Rule that they are authoritative only 0n the

facts

0n which they are founded.

General expressions must be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are
used. “There

decided by

is

it.”

a pronounced line of demarcation between What
(Citation 0mitted).’

Bashore

v.

is

said in an opinion and What

is

Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 238 P. 534 (1925) (emphasis

in 0riginal).”).

Because the questions raised on the appeal In re Estate omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d
6 (2018) only addressed the power and the validity 0f the Will, there

is

no disposition

whether Decedent’s heirs had been divested of their statutorily-conferred ownership

as t0

interests

by

the operation of the Magistrates Rule 70 (b) Instrument.

Because

that question

was

neither raised nor decided

Supreme Court has no binding precedent concerning

0n

that appeal, the decision

the question raised

upon

0f the

Hillen’s Motion,

nor does that appellate decision establish “law 0f the case” for the purposes of Hillen’s Motion.

See

e.g.,

Smith

By and Through Smith

v.

Treasure Valley Seed Company, LLC, 164 Idaho 654,

657, 434 P.3d 1260, 1263 (2019).
In addition to the rules establishing the extent 0f a binding precedent, 0r the application

of the “law of the case” doctrine, neither resjudicata, nor
recent appeal apply to the ownership issue raised

collateral estoppel, as arising out

0n Hillen’s Motion. Resjudicata and

estoppel only apply t0 “subsequent” litigation. Maravilla

v.

J.R.

of the

collateral

Simplot Ca, 161 Idaho 455,

458, 387 P.3d 123, 126 (2016)
Collateral estoppel has

n0 preclusive

must be raised had been actually decided

effect

because the application requires the issue

in the prior litigation.

Brown

v.

State, Indus. Special

Indem. Fund, 138 Idaho 493, 496, 65 P.3d 515, 518 (2003). (“Collateral estoppel applies t0
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issues that actually

and necessarily have been decided

in prior litigation”).

0f the personal representative’s “ownership” of Decedent’s

Neither the question

nor the divestiture 0f the

assets,

Decedent’s heirs of ownership of the Decedent’s assets, was raised and actually decided as a

consequence of the

earlier appeal.

subj ect t0 collateral attack at

In the

to the

same

The

issue 0f the voidness of the Rule 70(b) Instrument

any time by any Party affected by

is

it.

vein, this speciﬁc question as to ownership of Decedent’s assets

—

as

opposed

presumption the personal representative would perform his statutory functions within the

conﬁnes 0f the possessory

trust rights conferred

upon him under

for adjudication until the Personal Representative actually

the

UPC — did not become ripe

— and unexpectedly — choose

advance such a fallacious position 0f “actual ownership” 0f Decedent’s

t0

assets, egregiously in

excess 0f his statutorily-conferred authority t0 engage this present ejectment proceeding, and in
excess 0f the Magistrate’s jurisdiction 0r authority.

Resjudicata does not bar adjudication of claims that were not ripe for adjudication in the
prior proceeding. Pocatello

Hosp,

LLC

v.

Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC, 157 Idaho 732,

740-41, 339 P.3d 1136, 1144-45 (2014); Bell Rapids Mut.
753-54, 890 P.2d 338, 339-340 (1995); and Duthie

v.

Irr.

C0.

v.

Hausner, 126 Idaho 752,

Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 754,

663 P.2d 287, 290 (1983).

N0

accepted Idaho doctrine 0f prior adjudication, Whether

it

be rules for construction and

application of precedent, the law 0f the case doctrine, 0r the doctrines 0f resjudicata 0r collateral

estoppel, establishes

any bar to bringing

this

challenge to potentially ultra Vires actions upon

which the Personal Representative has predicated

his

Motion

Pleadings in this matter.

Appellant’s Opening Brief

P.

39

for Partial

Judgment on the

Therefore, thefundamental issue that

must be addressed by

this

Court

is

whether Hillen has

the requisite standing t0 assert “ownership”, the fundamental element of an ejectment Action.

Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho

In the case 0f

(2002), the

C0111“:

102, 104-105,

noted the signiﬁcance andfundamental importance Ofstanding:
a fundamental tenet 0f American Jurisprudence that a person Wishing t0

“It is

invoke a court’s jurisdiction must have standing. Standing
to

44 P.3d 1157, 1159-1 160,

be determined by

standing

is

doctrine

is

this court

a subcategory t0

a preliminary question

is

before reaching the merits 0fthe case.

justiciabz'lity.

As

this court

The

doctrine of

has previously noted, the

imprecise and difﬁcult t0 apply. Standing focuses 0n the party seeking

reliefand not 0n the issues the party wishes t0 have adjudicated.

T0

satisfy the case

0r controversy requirement 0f standing, a litigant must allege 0r demonstrate an

and a substantial likelihood the reliefrequested will prevent 0r redress
the claimed injury. This requires a showing Ofa distinct palpable [perceptible, plain,
obvious, readily Visible, noticeable, patent, distinct, manifest] injury and fairly
injury in fact

traceable casual connection between the claimed injury

and the challenged conduct.”

(Emphasis by italic ours) See also Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d
1243 (201 1), Where standing was again addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court and
reiterated in

201

1.

Our Appellate Courts emphasized
Trust, 153 Idaho 425,

this

283 P.3d 742 (2012), wherein thefundamental need

and demonstrate standing before a claim or a defense can proceed.
,

In order to

McLean

fundamental issue in

satisfy the

It

v.

Cheyovich Family

for a litigant t0 establish

stated:

requirement 0f standing, the petitioner must allege or

demonstrate a distinct palpable injury in
challenged conduct, and that there

is

fact, that

the injury

is fairly

traceable t0 the

a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief

requested Will prevent or redress the claimed injury.

As
from the
Ina,

v.

to the

ownership of a Decedent’s property, the Court determines the Legislature's intent

statutory language

and ordinary meaning 0f the terms, as

it

was

stated in

Kechter, 137 Idaho 62, 64, 44 P.3d 1117, 1119 (2002), and in Hoffer

v.

Ag Servs.

0fAm.,

Shappard, 160 Idaho

870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016), wherein the Court stated:

The

objective of statutory interpretation

is

t0 give effect t0 legislative intent.” State

“When

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007).

v.

interpreting a

.” Williams v. Blue
words 0f the statute.
Cross OfIdaho, 151 Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 (2011). “If the statutory

statute, the

Court begins with the

literal
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.

unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be
.” Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada
given effect.
Cnty. Bd. oquualization, 157
Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
St. Luke’s Reg’ l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. 0fC0mm ’rs ofAda Cnly., 146 Idaho 753, 755,
language

is

.

.

203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This Court does not have the authority to modify an
unambiguous legislative enactment. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’ l Med. Ctr., 151
Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011) (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170,
177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962)).

The Order of

the lower court resulted in the Partial

Judgment and grant 0f a writ of

assistance t0 Hillen for the purpose 0f terminating the “occupation” 0f VKSIII.

The question

concerning Whether the lower court was correct in ordering ejectment depends upon whether
Hillen has been determined t0 be the sole owner 0f the property. See

v.

Total Success Investments,

LLC, 145 Idaho

Ada County Highway Dist.

360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), stating “Ejectment

requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession

by

the defendants,

defendants t0 surrender possession, citing also t0 Pro Indiviso, Inc.

v.

and

(3) refusal

Mid—Mile Holding

0f the
Trust,

131 Idaho 741, 745, 963 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1998)”
Therefore, Hillen has the

statute

initial

and the existing case law. He

supra, from

burden

is

t0 establish his “ownership”,

which

a “ﬁduciary” under the law, stiﬂed by

owning any of the Decedent’s property. He cannot escape the

restrictions within the requirements

of the

UPC

and the

fact there

were no

is

negated by

Lemp

v.

Lemp,

limitations

and

debts.

In the alternative, if Hillen, as the Personal Representative, were t0 secure the right t0

possession,

it

would then be

in trustfor the

exercise of his statutorily-conferred powers

by

the

UPC, and With n0

mal-feasance.

creditors, the act

beneﬁt offhe Estate creditors and heirs, and Hillen’s
is

constrained

by

the limitations

0f taking possession

is

imposed upon him

an act 0f mis—feasance

if

not

Hillen cannot demonstrate the existence of an objective necessity for taking

possession 0f the property for the beneﬁt 0f estate creditors and other interestedpersons (LC. §
15-3-71 1)

Who d0

not

exist.
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In the exercise 0f these

powers under the UPC, Hillen remains subject

t0 the issuance

0f

restraining orders as direct at his actions taken in excess 0f his statutory authority (LC. § 15-3-

607), and he personally remains liable in

§ 15-3-712).

He

money damages

cannot demonstrate necessity, even

if he

for breach of his ﬁduciary duties (LC.

were

t0 escape his inability t0 establish

“ownership”, the fundamental and crucial element that must be established, as a matter of law,

which here

I.

sorely lacking under the Statutes and case law.

is

The Lower Court’s Decision Is Internally Inconsistent If It Both Recognizes
That Hillen Is An “Owner” Of The Decedent’s Property As A Result Of The
Entry

The

Of The Rule

70(b) Instrument,

Statutory Obligations

Obligations Are

its

A

A

He Also Remains Subiect T0
The Existence Of Which Trust

That

Trustee,

Not Consistent With

Owner Of Decedent’s
On

Of

And

Declaration That Hillen Is The Sole

Property

face, the only intended function t0

be served by the issuance of the Rule 70(b)

Instrument was t0 address restoration 0f Decedent’s interest, but can only be accomplished With

proper jurisdiction, due process and statutory compliance With the
raised, placed at issue, 0r actually

decided concerning the matter

court that the effect of that Rule 70(b) Instrument

was

UPC. No

now

t0 vest sole

under

I.C. §

ownership as a 2/3““ heir) Which

was ever

presented to the lower

ownership 0f any 0f

Decedent’s assets in Hillen, and correspondingly t0 fully divest an intestate
interest in the property (2/3rds

question

heir,

Vernon, of his

interest arose as a matter

0f law

15-3-101.Hillen’s expressly-stated objective has been t0 completely liquidate the

Estate 0f Victoria H. Smith, as if his ﬁduciary duty under the

UPC

is

no

different than his

behavior as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, his only judicial experience.
Hillen’s Complaint in each of these four district court proceedings has been predicated

upon

his

claim of “ownership” 0f Decedent’s property, not upon any statutory right 0f

“possession.”
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The

statutory

Representative’s

ﬁduciary duty imposed by the

power

t0 acquire “possession’

but cart blanc ownership of the property

is

UPC

does not prevent a Personal

0f property under certain limited circumstances,

prohibited, as expressed in

Lemp, supra. LC.

§ 15-3-

906, and Hillen’s declared intention to completely liquidate the Estate for n0 reason but t0 d0 so
in direct contravention

is

properly. Because Hillen

over the

title,

is

0f the express

UPC

standards requiring the preservation 0f estate

only granted possession of the Estate property—holding only a power

but not holding the actual

title

itself—there is

an inherent restraint imposed upon his

actions as a result of the statutorily-declared ﬁduciary duty he

Hillen did not seek this Judgment for ejectment

owes

t0 the heirs.

upon any conﬁrmation he was a

trustee

of Decedent’s property; he requested a declaration, as based upon the Rule 70(b) Order, that he
the actual

and

sole

owner 0f Decedent’s property, and such an outcome

is

serves to eliminate

Hillen’s statutorily-created trust relationship with the heirs, and as a consequence, serves t0

extinguish his ﬁduciary duty t0 heirs, which cannot be allowed t0 occur under the restraints and
limited powers expressed within the

The speciﬁc
is

the declaration

by

the

relief Hillen requested

made by

Supreme Court on

estate property,

protected

by

UPC.
0n

this

motion — and the

relief speciﬁcally

opposed —

Hillen that the probate court’s Rule 70(b) Instrument, not ruled

appeal, has established Hillen to be the sole

Which ownership eliminates any

upon

and absolute owner 0fthe

trust interest retained

by

the heirs and as

the personal representative’s ﬁduciary duty t0 the heirs.

Hillen’s request exceeds the statutory authority, and in fact

is

substantially in excess 0f

the statutorily-granted authority over a Decedent’s property provided t0 a personal representative

by

I.C. §

15-3-71

1.

In the normal course 0f events Hillen’s “power” exercised in trust under LC. § 15-3-7 11
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only permits him t0 divest the heirs’

title,

as acquired

When such divestment has been determined
Under LC.

§

15-3-101,

title

t0

by operation 0f law under

be necessary

I.C. § 15-3-101,

t0 satisﬁ/ estate claims.

to estate property passes to the heirs at the time

of a

decedent’s death, subject only to the possible subsequent divestiture if necessary in the
administration of the estate

descend

at

by the exercise 0f the power granted by LC.

§ 15-3-71

death to successors identiﬁed by any probated Will, 0r to heirs if no Will

1.

(“Estates

is

probated,

subject t0 rights

Which may be implemented through administration.” Ofﬁcial Comment

15-3-101,

The

1]

1).

heirs obtain

and retain

title,

subject only t0 divestment of their

title

I.C. §

by

the

Personal Representative’s exercise 0f power pursuant to LC. § 15—3—711, and limited by a
required determination that divestment 0f the heir’s ownership interest

is

necessary for the

administration 0f the estatefor the beneﬁt ofcreditors 0r other interestedparties.
If Hillen

Vernon’s entire

were the sole owner of the Decedent’s property, With the divestment 0f
interest,

then the trust-relationship created by I.C.

§

15-3-711

has been

effectively extinguished along With the right of heirs to bring claims for a breach 0f ﬁduciary

duty by Hillen. If Hillen

is

no longer required

t0 act within the exercise

power, but as a sole owner 0f the property, then there n0 longer
protect,

and neither heir has standing

estate has

to challenge Hillen’s actions

is

of a statutorily-conferred

any ﬁduciary

because their interest in the

been extinguished by the entry of the Rule 70(b) Instrument. This

probate code expects, nor the legitimate purpose 0f the magistrate
court’s jurisdiction

interest to

i

is

not what the

the proper exercise 0f the

and authority.

The lower court could not grant

Hillen’s request for ejectment, Without being a “titled

owner” 0f the property, a fundamental element

t0

an

ej ectment

action,

done.

Appellant’s Opening Brief

P.

44

Which

this

lower court has

J.

The Magistrate Had
Eliminate

An Heir’s

N0

Authority

Ownership

BV Use Of The Rule

Interest,

70(b) Order

To

A Matter Of Law Under

Obtained As

15-3-101

I.C.

Even though

Supreme Court’s opinion did not address 0r decide the

the

construction,

application or intended purpose of the Rule 70(b) Instrument, the language of that Instrument

on

its

face

— does not support

Hillen’s contentions

property t0 him. The Rule 70(b) Instrument,

made

it

conferred sole ownership in Decedent’s

the transfer to Hillen conditioned

capacity “as personal representative 0f the Estate.”

—

This conditional reference must

upon

his

conﬁrm

Hillen could only take possession, and as only authorized t0 exercise a “power” over that
property, as consistent with the provisions 0f the

UPC

concerning the authority and powers 0f a

personal representative.4

A personal representative, in his actions in the administration 0f an estate, is bound by the
limitations

imposed by the UPC.

statutory constraints placed

The Ofﬁcial Comment

t0

upon a Personal Representative’s

LC.

15-3-703 notes the speciﬁc

§

actions

by declaring

that:

[A] personal representative’s authority is derived from appointment by the
public agency known as the Court. But, the Code also makes it clear that the

personal representative, in spite of the source of his authority,

is

t0

proceed with

the administration, settlement and distribution 0f the estate

powers and
.Hillen

effect

is

in accordance with statutory directions.

by use 0f statutory
See Sections 3-107 and 3-704.

attempting to act in excess 0f his statutorily-conferred authority by claiming the

of the Rule 70(b) Instrument made him the sole “owner” 0f Decedent’s property, and t0

divest heirs 0f all statutorily-conferred

Somewhat more problematic

title

is

in Decedent’s property.

the

language that appears Within the Rule 70(b)

4

Rule 821 0f the Idaho Family Law Rules is the rule that corresponds t0 Idaho Civil Rule 70. The last sentence 0f
Rule 821 addresses issuance 0f an order for the transfer 0f “possession,” as opposed the Rule 70’s singular focus
upon transfer 0f “title.” (“When any order or judgment is for the delivery 0f possession, the party in Whose favor it
is

entered

rule has

is

entitled to a writ

no application here,

of execution or assistance upon application

it is

cited for the proposition a distinction

to the clerk”). Although the family law
between “possession” and “title” has been

recognized in other contexts.
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Instrument concerning the divestment 0f the property interest of Vernon K. Smith.

(2),

On page two

the Magistrate referenced the scope 0f this divestment as extending to Vernon’s capacity,

“individually,

,9

‘6

as Personal Representative,” (which he never was) “as attorney-in-fact or agent

or ﬁduciary,” and “any other capacity.”

The use of

language necessarily raises the question Whether
interest as

an

intestate heir

it

all-encompassing and overly-broad

this

was her

intention to defeat Vernon’s statutory

0f the Estate as established under LC.

§

15-3-101? If

it

were, she

should face a Judicial Cannon 0f Ethics inquiry, as n0 Judge had authority to eliminate the

0f an intestate heir derived under

interest

If this appellate

Instrument, t0 divest

become

Court were

Vernon 0f

I.C. § 15-3-101.

t0 accept Hillen’s

proposed construction 0f the Rule 70(b)

his interest, then does

the sole intestate heir 0f the estate?

Or

is it

t0

Joseph H. Smith — Vernon’s brother —

be construed that Hillen’s sole ownership

0f Decedent’s property necessarily operates to also eliminate Joseph’s
estate?

5

Neither the magistrate

heir’s intestate share without

— nor any

the authority t0 eliminate an

result.

By

6

—

analogy t0 the rules of contract construction, as

be relied upon in the interpretation 0f Court orders, n0 effect should be given t0 a Court order

that

would lead

(1964).

A

to

such an absurd

result.

Statutes

Vernon’s

Schieche

v.

Pasco, 88 Idaho 36, 41, 395 P.2d 671, 673

Court cannot act in excess 0f statutorily-conferred authority, as cited in State

Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731

5

— has

any speciﬁc grant of statutory authority allowing such an action

such an outcome constitutes an absurd
to

judicial ofﬁcer

intestate share in the

01'

(Ct.

v.

App. 2008) and discussed above, Where governing

Court Rules did not authorize the particular decision made bv the court.

146

Victoria Converse, assigned her 1/3 intestate share to Vernon, such that he holds 2/3 share in the
and his brother Joseph holds a 1/3 interest under the current state 0f the probate proceedings. If the
Rule 70(b) Order is construed, t0 eliminate Vernon’s intestate share in the estate, then as the sole remaining intestate
heir whose interest has been neither assigned nor expressly eliminated by court order, become the sole intestate heir
of the estate? That would be a most absurd result that never could have been the intended purpose, assuming the
sister,

intestate estate

magistrate adheres t0 the ICJC.
6

The “Slayer’s Act,”

as codiﬁed at

LC.

§

15-2-803, would constitute one such example of speciﬁc statutory

authority that permits the elimination of an intestate heir’s interest in an estate.
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Idaho

at

375, 195 P.3d at 734. Armstrong cited the principle in People

v.

American Contractors

Indemnity Ca, 33 Cal.4th 653, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004), that courts acting
contrary to authority conferred

P.3d

at 735. It is

by

statute act in excess

of its jurisdiction—146 Idaho

at

376, 195

fundamentally irrational for Hillen t0 claim the magistrate intended the Rule

70(b) Instrument t0 have the effect Hillen advocates, as the magistrate had n0 authority t0 enter

an order to that

effect.

Consequently, Hillen’s request for

relief, as

based upon his misplaced

owner 0f

construction of the Rule 70(b) Instrument to support his claim to ejectment—the sole

Decedent’s property—to allow him t0 simply liquidate estate property, must be summarily
rejected

by

this appellate court.

Hillen’s proposed

inconsistent With the provisions 0f the

“power” over

Supreme Court’s decision

construction of the Idaho

estate property, as

UPC

Lemp

conﬁrms (“The administrator or executor
ofﬁcial character, only holds

it

Which only confer upon a personal representative a

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

v.

is

entirely

is

P. 222,

not the owner 0f any part 0f the estate.

in trust for the parties entitled t0

it,

223 (1919)
He, in his

subject to the purposes of

administration.”).7

Court judgments and decrees are subject t0 the same rules of interpretation as apply to
construction of contracts.

McKoon

v.

Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925, 928 (2008).

A prominent rule 0f contract interpretation is that contracts must be
then-existing law. Path t0 Health,

(“‘This Court has held that “it

every written contract.

,9”,

is

LLP

v.

Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016)

axiomatic that extant law

(citations

omitted).

This

interpretation 0f an appellate decision in, Application

7

interpreted in respect t0 the

is

rule

written into and

made

a part of

was expressly applied

t0

the

ofKaufmcm, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206

Although Lemp was decided under the 1864 Idaho Probate Code,

this principle

Idaho’s 1971 adoption 0f the Uniform Probate Code.
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of law appears un-altered by

P.2d 528, 533 (1949) (“What the court
statutes as they then existed

and applied,

said, therefore,

.

.

.

.”);

and

in,

163, 174 P.2d 212, 213 (1946), (noting that an executor

law

.

.

supra,

.”).

.

is

The UPC,

as in effect at the time

in connection

In re Anderton

’s

Estate, 67 Idaho 160,

act “in strict

must

0f the referenced appeal

in,

with the

compliance With the

In

Re

omeith,

Estate

incorporated Within and applies t0 the interpretation 0f the Rule 70(b) Order and to the

interpretation 0f the Idaho

Supreme Court’s opinion on

The Rule 70(b) Instrument must be
statutes,

must be taken

which

statutes only confer

appeal.

interpreted consistent with the applicable

upon a personal

representative a “power” over

title,

UPC
When

necessary in the administration for the beneﬁt 0f creditors and other interested persons. I.C. § 15—
3-711.

K. Whether VKSIII

Is Entitled

To An Award Of Costs, And Preserve The

Issue

Of Attorney Fees, Should He Prevail On This Appeal?
Should VKSIII prevail 0n

Motion

for Partial

and Butters

v.

this appeal,

based upon the

district court error in granting the

Judgment on the Pleadings, he should be awarded

Valdez, 149 Idaho 764, 771, 241 P.3d 7, 14 (Ct. App. 2010), Because this court

when

has demonstrated in other cases a reluctance t0 award fees
reversed, Appellant

on appeal

to

40

costs pursuant t0 I.A.R.

would request

this

a

summary

disposition

is

Court reserve any disposition on the issue of attorney fees

be determined by the lower Court upon conclusion of trial, where a prevailing party

Will then be established. See Berrett v Clark

P.3d 555 (2019), wherein the court

“The School

County School District N0.

Distn'ct

award attorney

and Ryan Barrett both seek attorney

fees at this time. Porg’olio

Idaho 228, 235, 395 P.3d 1261, 1268 (2017). Instead,
the district court may

165 Idaho 913, 454

stated:

Whistleblower Act. Because this opinion does not yet resolve
decline to

61,

Ryan

Recovery Assocs.
if either

fees

under the

Benett’s claim,
v.

party ultimately prevails, then

award that party attorney fees incurred in bringing this appea

In Porﬂolio Recovery Assocs.

v.

we

MacDonald, 162
.”

MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, 235, 395 P.3d 1261, 1268 (2017),
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this

court stated:

“MacDonald requests an award of attorney's

fees

on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code

section

12-1200), Which allows reasonable attorney's fees t0 the prevailing party. Because the case
is

not yet resolved, there

this

is

n0

prevailing party.

Court has refused t0 award attorney's

P.3d 465, 469 (2005). If MacDonald

is

fees.

Where

there

Howard v.

is

n0 present prevailing

patty,

Perky, 141 Idaho 139, 143, 106

ultimately the prevailing patty, then the tﬁal court

may award him attorney's fees for this appeal.”

VII.

CONCLUSION

This case must be remanded to the District Court, with instructions t0 vacate the

Judgment entered upon the Pleadings,
titled

as Hillen

had n0 standing

and vested owner 0f Decedent’s property, and

irreparable

harm

t0 grant his

to the real party(s) that are the titled

property, and a miscarriage ofjustice

to assert

he

is

the exclusive

Motion serves

t0

impose

and vested owners 0f the Decedent’s

by the denial 0f due process

that wrongfully dispossesses

others 0f a property interest held lawfully and With unfettered authorization from the Decedent

and Vernon since 2006, and following Victoria’s death,

now

With the continuing approval and

request of the 2/3““ heir to the property ownership, seeking to preserve and maintain the property
for the best interests 0f the heirs.

Respectfully submitted this 26th day of August, 2020.
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